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NOTE
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
ON MOOTED CLAIMS
The American Rule on attorneys' fees, requiring each party to
bear the cost of his legal representation in civil suits regardless of
outcome,' is pitted with exceptions. Numerous state and federal
statutes provide for the reimbursement of a plaintiff's legal ex-
penses.2 The statutes seek to reward the plaintiff for successfully
enforcing the law and to encourage other citizens to do likewise.3
Even without statutory authorization, courts have allowed a com-
plainant to recover attorneys' fees where his efforts have conferred
a common benefit on a definable class. 4 Recovery under the com-
mon benefit banner derives from the theory of unjust enrichment.5
' See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Alyeska
involved an attempt to recover attorneys' fees under the private attorney general theory.
Congress had mooted the plaintiffs' original action by amending the statute upon which it
was based. Holding that the case fell within the American Rule and outside any of its
exceptions, the Court refused to award attorneys' fees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a)
(1970) (court may tax as costs various specified items including nominal attorney's and
proctor docket fees); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1955) (court may not award
attorney's fees unless explicitly permitted by statute). But see ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010
(1973) (reversing American Rule). The history behind the Alaskan statute is discussed in
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
636, 647 (1974).
This Note uses the terms "attorneys' fees," "legal expenses," "legal fees" and "counsel
fees" interchangeably. Petitions for attorneys' fees normally encompass lawyers' profes-
sional fees as well as all out-of-pocket expenses charged to clients. See, e.g., Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1977).
2 See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b),
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 706(k), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, § 810, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970);
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198 (McKinney Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.48 (Page
Supp. 1976).
3 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). Cf notes
181-88 and accompanying text infra (Congress intended that courts award statutory attor-
neys' fees only after proof of defendant's liability on merits).
4 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Fletcher v. A.J. Indus., Inc.,
266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
Common benefits come in many varieties. They may include such benefits as the pro-
tection of corporate democracy through proxy disclosure (see, e.g., Mills), the vindication of
labor union democracy (see, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)), and environmental protec-
tion (see, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 857 (1977)). See generally note 5 infra.
5 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970), the Court stated: "To
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allow the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing
equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's
expense." Similarly, Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973), stated that the purpose of the fee award was "to com-
pensate the attorney for the reasonable value of services benefiting the unrepresented
claimant." See notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra. Thus, reimbursement comes from
those who benefit. Often this class consists of non-parties. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Resi-
dents Ass'n v. City Council, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 11, 141 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863 (1977) (plain-
tiffs' litigation benefited "many citizens of Los Angeles"). In some cases, however, such as
shareholders' derivative suits, the recipient of the benefit is the defendant corporation. See,
e.g., Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1199 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 150 (1968). This theory of recovery of legal expenses looks beyond the nominal
designation of the corporation as a defendant to see that the interests of the corporation
actually align with those of the plaintiff. The corporation therefore shares the cost of ob-
taining the benefit. See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Sub-
stantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAMP. L. REv. 164, 169 (1972).
As a corollary to the proposition that reimbursement for attorneys' fees comes from
those who benefit, the benefit must actually accrue to the class members before a court will
award attorneys' fees. Thus in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1978),
the Second Circuit refused to permit an assessment of legal expenses against unclaimed
shares of a fund. The suit, a class action, had resulted in a six million dollar judgment
against the defendant. The trial court placed this money in an escrow account, and or-
dered that attorneys' fees be paid to plaintiffs from the fund as a whole. Rejecting this
approach, the court of appeals directed the trial judge to set a reasonable period of time
for the class members to file proof of claims. After all the claims are processed, the trial
court will assess attorneys' fees on a pro rata basis against the claimed shares.
The common benefit exception extends the common fund exception. The Supreme
Court first sanctioned a common fund exception to the American Rule in Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). The common benefit extension allows a court to award
attorneys' fees despite the absence of a monetary fund or property within the court's juris-
diction. See Schectman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957) (dictum); D'Amico v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 25, 520 P.2d 10, 28, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 804
(1974).
Some authorities suggest that Alyeska reaffirmed only the common fund exception. See,
e.g., Foley v. Devaney, 528 F.2d 888, 892 (3d Cir. 1976). These authorities, however, read
the case too literally. Although the Alyeska court spoke in the text of its opinion of a com-
mon fund, it cited without limitation Mills, which spoke of a common benefit. 421 U.S. at
257-58. Furthermore, the Court seemed to reaffirm the broader exception when it noted:
In this Court's common-fund and common-benefit decisions, the classes of ben-
eficiaries were small in number and easily identifiable. The benefits could be
traced with some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that the costs
could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting. In this case,
however, sophisticated economic analysis would be required to gauge the extent to
which the general public, the supposed beneficiary, as distinguished from selected
elements of it, would bear the costs.
Id. at 265 n.39. Finally, three members of the Alyeska majority explicitly reaffirmed the
common benefit theory in a dissent to the denial of certiorari in United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 98 S. Ct. 1627 (1978). The case involved the award of attorneys' fees to an
intervenor in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor challenging a union election.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice White, the author of Alyeska, noted: "The Third Cir-
cuit panel, in adopting a common-benefit theory, correctly observed that our opinion in
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society... recognized the continuing vitality of that theory."
Id. at 1629. The dissenters argued, however, that the court of appeals went beyond
Alyeska because the class of beneficiaries was neither small nor easily definable, and
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When litigating within an exception to the American Rule, 6
because the benefit conferred by the overturn of a local election could not be traced to
the entire union membership.
Alyeska should therefore be read to stand for the following proposition: Absent a statute,
courts will not reimburse a "private attorney general" for the common benefit conferred
on the public, but they will reimburse a complainant with a personal stake in the case
who confers a benefit on a definable class even if the suit does not bring an actual mon-
etary fund into the court. Several courts and commentators have embraced this interpre-
tation. See, e.g., Academic Computer Sys., Inc. v. Yarmuth, 71 F.R.D. 198, 201 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281, 282, 301 n.97 (1977). The California Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest,
20 Cal. 3d 25, 46-47, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326-27 (1977), partially
rejected Alyeska, holding that California courts can award attorneys' fees on a private attor-
ney general theory where the plaintiff vindicates a right guaranteed by the California Con-
stitution.
Although the common benefit exception does not require that a court have within its
jurisdiction an actual fund or property, a court must find as a condition precedent to
recovery that the benefit conferred was substantial. See Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp.
807, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). No generally accepted definition of "substantial" exists, but a few
examples illustrate the scope of the exception. In Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554
F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1627 (1978), the court of appeals reversed
a lower court order denying recovery of attorneys' fees under the common benefit ex-
ception to a defeated candidate for local union office. The petitioner had assisted the
Secretary of Labor in successfully attacking violations of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act's election provisions (29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1970)). The court found
that vindication of the democratic process in an individual district could qualify as a sub-
stantial benefit conferred upon the entire union. 554 F.2d at 605. In Schectman v. Wolf-
son, -244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957), defendants had mooted an action brought under
§ 8 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970)) to force the dismantling of interlock-
ing directorships. The Second Circuit denied the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees
because the court found no substantial benefit. A California court, in Woodland Hills
Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 75 Cal. App. 3d 1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1977), ruled that
environmental protection afforded to the citizens of Los Angeles by the enforcement
of land use development requirements constitutes a concrete benefit sufficient to support
an award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 9, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
As with the substantial benefit requirement, courts have not clearly defined the ascer-
tainable class requirement. On the one hand, the class does not have to be a formal, cer-
tified class. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); United States v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 466 F.2d 917, 919 (2d Cir. 1972). On
the other hand, in Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1975), the Seventh
Circuit denied attorneys' fees to a state prisoner because the class of beneficiaries-
purportedly all Illinois prisoners-was too indefinite. Prison authorities had mooted, by
adopting new regulations, petitioner's challenge to the practice of not supplying a state-
ment of reasons for disciplinary sanctions until after the prisoner had satisified the sanc-
tions.6
"Although beyond the focus of this Note, a third exception to the American Rule
deserves mention. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975), declared that a court may award attorneys' fees as part of a fine levied against a
defendant 'who has willfully disobeyed a court order or who has acted in bad faith. This
exception will rarely affect a plaintiff's decision to institute suit. As one commentator put
it, the petitioner "must win not only the merits of his case, but the sympathy of the court as
well." Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 717, 726 (1976).
Note, 8 CONN. L. REv. 551 (1976), discusses the scope of the third exception in light of Alyeska.
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success in the form of a judgment for the plaintiff automatically
qualifies him to petition for fee-reimbursement.7 When a defen-
dant moots an identical suit,8 the plaintiff does not automatically
lose his opportunity to recover legal expenses. 9 Under both the
common benefit and statutory exceptions, however, the plaintiff
must satisfy certain requirements established by the courts before
qualifying to recover legal expenses on a mooted claim.
The requirements applicable to the common benefit exception
substantially reduce the likelihood that the plaintiff will recover
attorneys' fees.10 Although differing on the details of these condi-
tions precedent to recovery, in general terms courts require a de-
termination that the mooted claim was meritorious" and a showing
that the initiation of the meritorious suit caused the defendant to
moot the action. 12 Part I of this Note will evaluate these obstacles
to recovery and will suggest a substantial modification in the com-
mon law governing awards of attorneys' fees on mooted claims un-
der the common benefit exception. Specifically, the requirement
of a showing of meritoriousness in the underlying claim is both
theoretically unsound and practically unnecessary. Causation and
7 Eligibility to petition does not guarantee that the plaintiff will ultimately recover his
legal expenses. A court may consider additional factors, either as part of its discre-
tionary power (see, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1973)), or as part of a statutory scheme (see, e.g., note
119 infra), in determining whether a plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees.
s For the purposes of this Note, a defendant moots a claim when he substantially satis-
fies the demands of the plaintiff's complaint so that ajusticiable controversy no longer exists.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); California v. San Pablo &
T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1893).
9 This Note discusses recovery of attorneys' fees in cases where the defendant acts
unilaterally to moot the claim. It does not include a comprehensive discussion of recovery
of legal expenses in cases settled by bilateral negotiations. Attorneys' fees are typically not
an issue in settled cases. Settling parties usually reach agreement on the allocation of legal
expenses. See, e.g., Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1017, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977);
Ellis v. Flying Tiger Corp., 504 F.2d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1972). Even when the parties
stipulate this allocation, however, courts have the power to review and modify the stipula-
tion if the settlement requires court approval. Such is the case under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See
Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 678-84 (S.D. Tex. 1976). When the parties
do not resolve the attorneys' fee issue in the settlement agreement, and one of the parties
petitions the court for an award, then many of the matters discussed in this Note come into
play. Therefore, this Note will use settled cases for illustrative purposes where appropriate.
1o See, e.g., Wechsler v. Southeastern Prop., Inc., 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Levine v.
Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967).
11 See notes 20-29 and accompanying text infra.
12 See notes 73-94 and accompanying text infra. This Note cannot discuss the variations
among all jurisdictions on the issues surrounding fee-reimbursement under the common
benefit exception. Instead, it will concentrate on several leading jurisdictions in the belief
that they will illustrate the major trends in the area.
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the plaintiff's good faith 13 alone should concern the courts. More-
over, the defendant should bear the burden of proof on the causa-
tion issue if, but only if, the plaintiff seeks to recover his legal
expenses from the defendant. 14
To become eligible to recover legal expenses on a mooted
claim under the statutory exception, a plaintiff must satisfy three
requirements. Most courts agree that a plaintiff must show that
initiation of legal action was necessary to obtain his objective15 and
that his suit caused the defendant to moot the claim.' 6 Courts di-
verge on the content of the third requirement. Some require that
the defendant's action substantially satisfy the demands of the
plaintiff's complaint.' 7 In the mooted claim context, this is by def-
inition no additional requirement at all. Other courts hold a trial
on the merits solely to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to
attorneys' fees.l 8 Still other courts require a finding that the plain-
tiff probably would have prevailed on the merits if the case had
gone to trial.' 9 Part II of this Note will examine these three alterna-
tives in light of legislative history and will propose a new test based
upon the third option.
I
RECOVERY UNDER THE COMMON
BENEFIT EXCEPTION
A. Meritorious Claim
1. Present State of the Law
Presented with a petition for an award of attorneys' fees,
courts require a threshold finding that the mooted suit was
meritorious. 20 This Note argues that the rationale for recovery of
13 See notes 44-50 and accompanying text infra.
14 See notes 95-105 and accompanying text infra.
15 See notes 169-73 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 169-73 and accompanying text infra.
'" See notes 174-90 and accompanying text infra.
18 See notes 191-98 and accompanying text infra.
19 See notes 199-202 and accompanying text infra.
20 See, e.g., Academic Computer Sys., Inc. v. Yarmuth, 71 F.R.D. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). The court held:
Under the exception pursuant to which fees may be allowed to a party who has
recovered or preserved a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, the
requisite showing must be that (a) plaintiff had a meritorious claim, (b) a substan-




legal expenses on mooted claims-unjust enrichment-does not
justify the use of the meritorious claim test. Courts should reject
this overly broad approach, and instead narrow their review to the
legitimate concerns of courts asked to award fees: subject matter
jurisdiction and equity.
Undr the present law, courts apply one of two variants of the
meritoriousness test. In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,2 ' plaintiff minority
shareholder filed an action against the controlling shareholder, the
board of directors and a tender offeror. He alleged, inter alia, a
Securities Exchange Act violation arising from an agreement by
the controlling shareholder to sell his shares to the tender offeror
at a price substantially higher than the remaining shareholders
would receive. After the plaintiff filed suit, the tender offeror twice
increased its offer, eventually paying the same price to all share-
holders. The defendants then successfully moved to dismiss the
suit as moot. Subsequently, the plaintiff petitioned the court to
order the defendants to pay his legal expenses. The trial judge de-
nied the petition on the ground that the petitioner's complaint
could not have survived a motion to dismiss.22 The Third Circuit
reversed, finding "that plaintiff's pleadings state a cause of action
which may be the basis for an award of counsel fees ....- 23 Thus,
under the Kahan approach, the minimum standard of meritorious-
ness requires that the claim be able to withstand a motion to dis-
miss. 24
Id. But see Note, supra note 5, at 183. The commentator stated that a petitioner could
obtain an award on a mooted claim without encountering further obstacles if the court
found that the claim was meritorious. The commentator further intimated that a showing
of merit demonstrated a causal connection between the suit and the defendant's mooting
act. Neither case law, as Academic indicates, nor logic supports this view. Situations could
certainly arise where, despite a meritorious claim, the defendant could prove that it acted
solely for business reasons. See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
21 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
22 300 F. Supp. 447, 450 (D. Del. 1969).
23 424 F.2d at 174.
24 Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974), suggests a different approach.
Union leaders, without membership approval, negotiated with the Mead Corporation an
extension of a pension plan. Union members brought a class action under § 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)) against the union leadership,
the company and the trustees of the pension fund, seeking termination of the unratified
pension plan and a refund of payroll deductions. The trial court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. While the case awaited appel-
late review, an agreement among the defendants to refund the pension deductions with
interest mooted the claim. Citing Kahan, however, the court of appeals stated that "if the
court below finds that the plaintiffs' original suit, even though dismissed, precipitated the
refund, then counsel is entitled to recover the reasonable costs of bringing the original
suit." 503 F.2d at 886. In addition the court found that the complainants could have sur-
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Some courts demand a more persuasive demonstration of
merit. The defendant in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Palley,25 a
mooted shareholder's derivative suit, challenged an award of legal
fees to the plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff had
failed to file a meritorious cause of action. On its way to holding
for the plaintiff, the Delaware Supreme Court enunciated its
meritoriousness test:
A claim is meritorious within the meaning of the rule if it can
withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings if, at the same
time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge of provable facts which
hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success. It is not
necessary that factually there be absolute assurance of ultimate
success, but only that there be some reasonable hope. 26
In effect, this test requires that the claims be able to survive a
motion for summary judgment.27
After reviewing the relevant case law, one commentator
suggests that courts should apply the summary judgment standard
to mooted claims that the defendant has never challenged by any
motion, and the less stringent motion to dismiss standard where
they have already denied such a motion.2 8 The commentator ar-
gues that the two-pronged approach would accomplish the purpose
vived a motion to dismiss had they based their suit on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). 503 F.2d at 883. The court then
reversed and remanded the case for proceedings on the attorneys' fee issue and on the
non-mooted issue of incremental damage caused to the membership by the delay in the
refund. Id. at 886.
Although the court cited Kahan, it made no mention of the meritorious claim test. The
court's language intimated that a plaintiff who could show causation could receive reim-
bursement even though the case is dismissed. This interpretation was not essential to the
holding, however, because the Fifth Circuit found that it could sustain the complaint by
employing a statute not pleaded by the plaintiffs.
25 310 A.2d 635 (Del. 1973).
26 d. at 637 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966)).
27 Although ostensibly requiring that the plaintiff present more than the minimum
necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment, the Palley test actually adds no
further significant obstacles. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) instructs the trial judge to grant a motion
for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact .... " If a genuine issue of material fact exists, each party has "some
reasonable hope" for success. The Palley test does not require a showing that the petitioner
probably would have prevailed on the merits. Therefore, for ease of discussion, this Note
will refer to the Palley test as the summary judgment standard.
28 Note, supra note 5, at 189. The commentator would have courts apply the less strin-
gent standard where the defendant has already unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss
"since [surviving a motion to dismiss] is some indication that the plaintiff would have been
able to prove the facts alleged in this pleading." Id. This rationale, however, fails to survive
scrutiny. A court will sustain a motion for a judgment on the pleadings "where the undis-
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behind the meritoriousness requirement, which, she contends, is to
prevent an award in a collusive lawsuit. 29
2. Criticism of the Present Test
The commentator rightly sought to reconcile the test with its
rationale. The meritorious claim test must seek justification in the
purpose underlying reimbursement for legal fees. In Mills v. Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co.,30 the Supreme Court set forth the foundation of
the common benefit exception: "To allow the other [class mem-
bers] to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without con-
tributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich
[them] unjustly at the plaintiff's expense."' l If an unjust enrich-
ment theory underlies the award of attorneys' fees on a mooted
claim, the merit of the original claim bears no relevance to the
subsequent claim for attorneys' fees. The defendant's reaction to
the plaintiff's claim, not the merit of the claim, created 32 the com-
mon fund or benefit.33 The plaintiff incurred expense procuring
the defendant's reaction. The class should not receive the fruits of
these expenditures while the individual who conferred the benefit
has his recovery entirely consumed by legal expenses. 34
puted facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the court will
take judicial notice, show that no relief can be granted." J.M. Blythe Motor Lines Corp. v.
Blalock, 310 F.2d 77, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1962). That a complaint survives such a motion indi-
cates nothing about the plaintiff's ability to prove the facts alleged.
20 Note, supra note 5, at 189-90. Federal and most state courts refuse to hear collusive
suits because collusiveness belies the existence of the case or controversy necessary for
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251 (1850); General Elec. Co. v. Bootz Mfg.
Co., 289 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ind. 1968); San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal. 2d 685, 693-94, 140
P.2d 666, 670 (1943). A suit suffering from ajurisdictional defect will not survive a motion
to dismiss.
30 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
3, Id. at 392.
32 This section assumes that causation exists. For a discussion of the causation issue,
see notes 71-94 and accompanying text infra.
33 Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), illustrates this principle in a tax context. A
corporation gave its ousted president $60,000 in settlement of his claim for breach of con-
tract, and $45,000 for his claim of injury to personal reputation. On his tax return, the
taxpayer included the $60,000 as income but did not include the $45,000 on the ground
that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) provides that damages recovered on personal injury claims do not
constitute income. The IRS assessed a deficiency, arguing that the taxpayer had failed to
prove any personal injury. Holding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court stated that "the de-
termination of whether a settlement payment is exempt from taxation depends on the
nature of the claim settled and not on the validity of the claim." 58 T.C. at 37.
34 Some might argue that it is not "unjust" to enrich a class while not compensating the
plaintiff who brings an unmeritorious claim. This position is based on the rationale that a
complainant who brings an unmeritorious action cannot reasonably expect reimbursement,
and that the courts should deny any award in order to discourage the initiation of un-
meritorious suits. Unmeritorious does not equal spurious, however. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327
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Case law recognizes this distinction between the original claim
and the claim for attorneys' fees. In Lindy Bros. Builders v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,35 counsel for a class petitioned
the court for fees after the judge had approved the settlement of
an antitrust action. The court analogized the petition to an action
in quantum meruit, and held that two possible "causes of action"
could serve as the basis for an award.36 One "cause" belongs to the
plaintiff who brought the underlying suit, for the reasonable value
of his service benefiting other class members, measured by the
expenses incurred by him on behalf of the class. 37 The second
possible "cause of action," and the one involved in Lindy, belongs to
the attorneys representing the class, for the reasonable value of
their services benefiting the class. 38 The court stated that the attor-
neys' claim could be subsumed in the plaintiff's claim for ex-
penses,3 9 although in this instance the attorneys asserted the claim
on their own behalf.
The distinction between the original suit and the attorneys' fee
petition becomes even clearer where the petitioner did not bring an
original action. In Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp.,40 a shareholder
employed an attorney to investigate possible securities violations by
corporate insiders. The attorney informed the corporation of par-
ticular violations, but the corporation refused to sue the alleged
violators. Apparently in response to the attorney's announced in-
tention to file a complaint based upon the fruits of his investiga-
tion, the corporation instituted an action against the insiders, which
resulted in a settlement. The shareholder and his counsel then
brought an independent action in state court for reimbursement of
the expenses they had incurred. After removal to federal court, the
petitioners recovered for the benefit conferred upon the corpo-
ration.4'
U.S. 678, 683 (1946) (action to recover damages for illegal search and seizure not "so
patently without merit as to justify . . . dismissal for want of jurisdiction."). The denial
seems unduly harsh and unrelated to its policy goals where the plaintiff did not bring the
suit in bad faith. The denial also leads to the anomalous result that a class which unde-
servedly receives a benefit does not contribute toward the expenses of its good faith bene-
factor, while a class which deservedly receives a benefit must part with some of it.
35 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
36 Id. at 165.
37 Id.
38 d. Cf. Prandini v. National Tea Co., No. 77-2261 (3d Cir. July 19, 1978) (statutory
fee award may include compensation for time spent preparing and litigating fee petition,
but common benefit award may not include such compensation because petition confers
no benefit on class).
391d. at 166.
40 326 F.2d 246, aff'd on rehearing en banc, 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
41 Id. at 248, 331 F.2d at 110. The Gilson court awarded attorneys' fees without men-
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Despite recognition of this distinction, courts have continued
to focus on the original action by use of the meritorious claim test.
A more rational approach to evaluating petitions for attorneys' fees
would apply tests that speak directly to courts' legitimate concerns,
specifically the equity of allowing recovery on this separate equita-
ble cause of action and the subject matter jurisdiction of the court
to hear the unjust enrichment claim. Elimination of the meritorious
claim test does not require that courts ignore the underlying suit
when they consider claims for attorneys' fees. Any examination of
the original claim, however, should occur in the context of consid-
ering equitable and subject matter jurisdiction concerns. Of course,
the subject matter jurisdiction requirement is not unique to peti-
tions for attorneys' fees. It is a separate concern of different origin
from the test used to determine whether a party should receive a
fee award. Nevertheless, the fee-shifting context generates unusual
jurisdictional problems.42
3. Proposed Test
An attorney petitioning for fees on an unjust enrichment
theory invokes the court's general equitable powers. 43 Therefore,
courts should develop a distinct equity test to replace the meritori-
ous claim test. Plaintiffs seeking equitable relief" 'must come with
clean hands.' 44 This judicial maxim "closes the doors of a court of
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to
the matter in which he seeks relief .... -45 A court confronted with
a claim for fees should examine the underlying action to determine
if the plaintiff and his attorney brought the original suit in bad
faith. 46 The unmeritoriousness of a claim brought in good faith
tioning the meritorious claim test. In Coran v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1060,
1062 (E.D. Wis. 1976). the court held that res judicata did not bar the plaintiff-share-
holder from bringing an independent action to recover attorneys' fees against the corpora-
tion for benefit conferred in a mooted "short swing" profits action.
42 See notes 51-70 and accompanying text infra.
4' Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973).
44 Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
45 Id.
46 In light of the two possible causes of action that the Lindy court mentioned, a judge
sitting in equity must distinguish between the plaintiff ahd his attorney when examining
the original suit for evidence of bad faith. A plaintiff might know that the complaint is
groundless but conceal this information from his attorney. FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 requires that
an attorney sign every pleading, thus certifying "that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief there is good ground to support it." This rule cannot, however, place an
affirmative duty on the attorney to investigate, prior to filing, the facts supporting his
client's complaint, other than those facts reasonably available to him. Notice pleading and
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should not bar the petitioner from equitable relief.
The commentator cited above asserted that the purpose of
requiring meritorious claims is to avoid granting legal fees in collu-
sive suits. 47 The narrower equity test would ensure the denial of
an award in such suits. Under present law, a court may determine
on its own initiative that a case is collusive, in which event it must
dismiss the action.48 Similarly, a collusive suitor violates the good
faith test of equity.
Another rationale underlying the meritorious claim test is the
desire to avoid awarding fees in nuisance suits. Courts often ex-
press concern over "strike suits"-groundless actions brought to
extort money by threatening to entangle the defendants in exten-
sive discovery. 49 Such concern does not, however, justify the
broad scope of the meritorious claim test. Defendants settle rather
than moot most strike suits for two reasons. First, the plaintiff
seeks only personal gain, not class benefit; he will not insist that
the defendant cure the alleged wrong. Second, even in a certified
class action, the defendant can settle for much less than his cost of
mooting the case because he has bargaining power in the threat
that if he litigates, the plaintiff and the class will probably receive
nothing.50 If a defendant does moot a nuisance suit, the equity
discovery relegate factual investigation to the period after filing. Cf 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1334, at 503 (1969) (courts ought to employ
signature rule only when attorney deliberately presses unfounded claim); 47 VA. L. REV.
1434, 1438 (1961) (interpretation of Rule 11 that indiscriminately demands knowledge of
probative facts supporting pleading in allegations may place prohibitive burden upon
counsel initiating actions in substantive areas where precision unobtainable prior to discov-
ery).
47 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) requires federal courts, by their own motion if necessary, to
dismiss actions over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction. Since federal and most
state courts lack jurisdiction over collusive suits (see note 29 supra), courts must dismiss
them. See General Elec. Co. v. Bootz Mfg. Co., 289 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (writ of
replevin set aside where parties had colluded to invoke court's power to move shipment
out of strikebound plant). Cf. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47,
48 (1971) (dismissing appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because "both litigants
desire[d] precisely the same result"). See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 40 (3d ed. 1976).49 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975);
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 680
(S.D. Tex. 1976). See generally Note, Reimbursenent for Attorneys' Fees from the Beneficiaries of
Representative Litigation, 58 MINN. L. REV. 933, 957-58 (1974).
50 This reasoning also applies to those cases in which the defendant runs a slight risk
of losing on the merits and incurring an enormous liability. To illustrate: In J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a trial court had the power to
void a merger tainted by a securities law violation and to order the defendant corporation
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test would defeat a petition for attorneys' fees.
In essence, courts in fee-shifting cases should substitute con-
cerns of bad faith for concerns about the merit of the original
action.
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The second legitimate judicial concern, subject matter juris-
diction, speaks to the courts' power to order the transfer of funds
between private parties. Although this requirement applies to all
actions-not just petitions for fee awards-and although it oper-
ates independently of any test for determining the propriety of
granting a fee award, unusual jurisdictional problems can arise in
the fee petition context. Article III of the Constitution limits the
judicial power of the federal courts to certain subject matter 51
beyond which they have no jurisdiction. 52 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3) authorizes a court to raise the jurisdictional
question on its own motion. The parties may not waive the subject
matter requirement nor may a court ignore the issue.53 State
courts, as repositories of general jurisdiction, are exempt from
this concern.54
A federal court may not consider a petition for legal fees un-
less it has jurisdiction over the matter. In a majority of cases, the
petition will arise as an incident to an action already within the
jurisdiction of the court.55 If the court had jurisdiction over the
to pay damages to shareholders. The defendant, if he chooses not to litigate, will settle
rather than moot such a case, because mooting would require a costly untangling of the
completed merger. The merger example suggests a general rule: An unmeritorious suit
having high nuisance value because of the enormous cost, albeit slim chance, of losing on
the merits will not be mooted; it will be settled. The same cost of losing that creates the
nuisance value negates the possibility that the defendant will voluntarily "lose," i.e., moot
the claim. Cf. Clanton v. Allied Chem. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Va. 1976) (court
notes that defendants often settle rather than take small risk of losing at trial). If for some
reason the defendant did moot the case, the equity test would apply. The court would
make an award if satisfied that the plaintiff caused a substantial benefit to accrue to a
definable class, unless the plaintiff brought the action in bad faith.
51 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This limitation is reflected in FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(h)(3). See
generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at §§ 7-8.
52 See Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1952) (dictum).
5 See Kern v. Standard Oil Co., 228 F.2d 699, 701, opinion supplemented, 230 F.2d 954
(8th Cir. 1956).
'4 See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at
§ 7.
5 See, e.g., Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
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mooted suit, then it has jurisdiction over any ancillary matters that
arise from the suit.56
The jurisdictional issue becomes more complex if the pe-
titioner conferred a benefit through some means other than
formal legal action. The Second Circuit, in Grace v. Ludwig,57 de-
vised an imaginative solution to overcome this potential difficulty.
The case arose from a decision by Berkshire Industries to file an
application with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
corporation was seeking permission to absorb its 91%-owned sub-
sidiary, American-Hawaiian Steamship Company, through a "short
form" merger. Plaintiffs, minority stockholders of American-
Hawaiian, and plaintiffs' counsel (LLB) intervened in the SEC
proceeding to oppose the application on the grounds, inter alia,
that Berkshire had violated the Investment Company Act and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.58 After extensive hearings, Berk-
shire withdrew its application and substantially increased its offer
for the minority shares. LLB asked the SEC to award attorneys'
fees to it, but the agency denied the claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs then brought suit in federal district court against Berk-
shire, American-Hawaiian and several of American-Hawaiian's
minority shareholders in an effort to obtain reimbursement for
legal fees.
The defendant minority shareholders urged that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court of ap-
peals rejected plaintiffs' attempt to rest jurisdiction upon the juris-
dictional sections of the Investment Company Act and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.59 Those sections grant jurisdiction
only over violations of the statutes or the rules promulgated there-
under: Berkshire did not violate the statute or rules because it
withdrew its application. 60 The court sustained jurisdiction, how-
ever, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants jurisdiction where the
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and "arises under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The court stated
that "this action for fees and expenses does arise under the stated
substantive sections of the Investment Company Act and the Se-
curities Exchange Act. Even though the minority stockholder de-
5 6 See Lee v. Terminal Transp. Co., 282 F.2d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 828 (1961); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
5 8 d. at 1265.




fendants did not violate the sections, it is alleged that they bene-
fitted from the LLB representation."' 6' Thus, an unjust enrichment
action can arise under a federal law because the courts consider
fee-shifting a remedial incident to a federal right.
Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc.,62 a case involving the Anthra-
cite Health and Welfare Fund, illustrates that identical original
suits can give rise to different results depending upon the juris-
dictional basis of the petition for legal fees. Anthracite coal oper-
ators had agreed to make royalty payments to the Fund to provide
pensions for retired miners. In the early 1960's, many operators
were delinquent in their royalty payments. The Fund trustees-
appointees of the United Mine Workers of America-refused to
take any action to collect these overdue payments. In 1963, the
Pensioned Anthracite Coal Miners Protest Executive Committee
filed a diversity action in federal court against the United Mine
Workers alleging that the union had failed to enforce the royalty
payment provisions of the Anthracite Wage Agreement. The court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal. Three days before
argument on appeal, the Fund trustees sued Honeybrook Mines
in federal court for overdue payments. The Committee inter-
vened in the Honeybrook Mines litigation. After the Fund trustees
obtained a judgment against Honeybrook Mines, the Committee
requested that the Fund pay the Committee's legal expenses arising
from the dismissed suit, even though the court of appeals had
upheld the dismissal, and legal expenses connected with its role as
intervenor in Honeybrook Mines. The trustees refused, and the issue
" Id. The Second Circuit employed a similar approach to sustain jurisdiction in Gilson
v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107, aff'g en banc 326 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1964). A
shareholder (Gilson) and his counsel (Levy) brought an action in state court to recover
legal expenses from the corporation even though Gilson had not taken any formal legal
action on behalf of the corporation. Gilson had employed Levy to discover whether in-
siders had engaged in stock transactions in violation of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Levy then informed the corporation of particu-
lar violations and requested that the corporation institute suit to recover "short swing"
profits. Initially, the corporation refused to act. Realizing that the statute of limitations
would soon run out, Levy prepared to bring a derivative suit. Before he was to file the
complaint, the corporation sued the insiders and recovered $56,000 in settlement. The
corporation, confronted with the shareholder's unjust enrichment action, removed the case
to federal court. The Second Circuit sustained jurisdiction based on § 16(b), reasoning that
since the section creates federal rights, "its remedial incidents also are a matter of federal
law." 331 F.2d at 109. The suit for reimbursement therefore arose under the laws of the
United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). 326 F.2d 246, 247 (2d Cir.
1964).
62 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
came before the Third Circuit. That court stated that although
dismissed,
[the first suit] cannot be ignored for purposes of the present
application, if, as we believe, the record discloses that it was in-
strumental in prodding the cautious trustees into more aggres-
sive action. It was on May 18, 1964, three days before the argu-
ment in this court on the appeal from dismissal of the committee's
... lawsuit, and fourteen months after that suit had been filed,
that the Fund trustees finally filed the complaint against Hon-
eybrook Mines which resulted in recoveries here in issue.63
Thus, the Third Circuit implicitly held that a federal court can
award attorneys' fees under Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. even
though it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the mooted claim.64
The Honeybrook Mines court did not discuss the jurisdictional
issue. The source of the court's power to award legal fees for work
done in a dismissed action over which it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction is not immediately apparent. Two possibilities exist.
First, if the trustees based their complaint in Honeybrook Mines on a
federal statute, such as the National Labor Relations Act,65 the
Grace approach would provide jurisdiction for the award. 66 Second,
if instead the trustees brought a diversity action against Honey-
:3 428 F.2d at 984.
64 Surprisingly, earlier in the same year the same court decided that the ability to
withstand a motion to dismiss is a condition precedent to an award of attorneys' fees on a
mooted claim. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. A strict application of the motion to dismiss
standard will not support the result in Honeybrook Mines. A court will dismiss an action if it
finds a jurisdictional infirmity in the pleadings. Application of the equity test, however,
would sustain the result. Only the presence of bad faith would cause a court to deny attor-
neys' fees to a plaintiff under the equity test. See notes 43-46 anA accompanying text supra.
A second alternative-a modified motion to dismiss standard-would also sustain the Hon-
eybrook Mines result. Under this test, a court would apply the motion to dismiss standard to
the merits of the case, but not to the jurisdictional aspects. This approach is consistent with
one of the major purposes behind the use of the meritorious claim test-fear of strike
suits-since strike suits, by definition, lack merit. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
This narrower standard, however, inadequately fulfills another suggested purpose of the
meritorious claim test-prevention of awards in collusive suits-since all collusive suits fail
jurisdictionally whether or not they lack merit. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
No court has articulated this modified motion to dismiss standard, but the test would ex-
plain the apparent inconsistency between Kahan and Honeybrook Mines. Assuming that the
Honeybrook Mines court did use a narrower meritorious claim test, this Note's criticism of the
present test would also apply to the modified standard because both focus on the merit of
the underlying action rather than on the plaintiff's bad faith.
65 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Congress granted federal courts juris-
diction over proceedings arising under federal legislation regulating commerce in 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).66 See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
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brook Mines, the court could have found that it had ancillary juris-
diction over the Committee's reimbursement claims against the
funds obtained in Honeybrook Mines. 7 The Supreme Court stated in
Fulton National Bank v. Hozier68 that
when a federal court has properly acquired jurisdiction over a
cause it may entertain, by intervention, dependent or ancillary
controversies; but no controversy can be regarded as dependent
or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets
actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or
control by the principal suit.69
The Committee's reimbursement claim did have a direct relation to
the trustees' recovery because the Committee alleged that its activ-
ity prompted the trustees to initiate the principal suit against Hon-
eybrook Mines. Neither of these theories would be available to
establish federal subject matter jurisdiction over the Committee's
attorneys' fee claim if the trustees had brought their action against
Honeybrook Mines in state court on a non-federal claim or if the
trustees had recovered the delinquent payments by non-judicial
methods. If federal courts lack jurisdiction to award legal fees in
a given case, however, the petitioner can bring an unjust enrich-
ment action in state court.70
67 See generally C. WmGHrr, supra note 48, at § 9.
68 267 U.S. 276 (1925).
691d. at 280.70 See, e.g., Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, aff'd on rehearing en bane,
331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964) (attorneys' fee action originally brought in state court).
A petitioner instituting an independent action to recover legal expenses, whether in
state or federal court, must obtain personal jurisdiction over the beneficiaries (in per-
sonam) or over the fund or property (quasi-in-rem). To obtain jurisdiction over the fund,
he would have to sue in the same court that handled the action that produced the fund. If
a petitioner wants to recover his legal expenses from a representative of the ultimate ben-
eficiaries, such as a corporation in the wake of a mooted shareholder's derivative suit, he
should have little difficulty in obtaining in personam jurisdiction. If a petioner repre-
sented a certified class, and the suit conferred a benefit on the class without bringing an
actual fund before the court, he must overcome a major obstacle before he can obtain a
judgment against the class members for legal expenses. In a certified class action, a judg-
ment may bind the non-party class members without violating the due process require-
ments of the Constitution if the class has adequate representative parties. See Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). When the class representative and his legal counsel seek
legal expenses from the class members, the representative's interest conflicts with the inter-
est of the class members and, therefore, he is no longer a constitutionally adequate repre-
sentative. See National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 346
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). To overcome the loss of this condition
precedent to in personam jurisdiction, the named party should give the class adequate
notice that he intends to demand contribution from them and should petition the court to
appoint independent counsel to represent the class on the attorneys' fee issue. See Haas v.
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In sum, the rationale behind the award of attorneys' fees-
unjust enrichment-does not support the use of the meritorious
claim test. In its stead, courts should employ an equity test and a
jurisdictional test. These narrower tests will enable a petitioner who
has conferred a substantial benefit on a definable class to recover
attorneys' fees in some court if he brought the initial action in good
faith.
B. Causation
1. Standard of Proof
The preceding discussion of the meritorious claim test as-
sumed causation. No one doubts that courts should require a causal
link between the pending lawsuit and the defendant's action to
moot the claim.7 1 If the plaintiff's suit did not cause the defendant
to confer a substantial benefit on a definable class, then the class
was not unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense. For example,
regardless of the pending action, the defendant may have mooted
the claim in response to business conditions72 or a change in the
regulating statutes. 73 The issue, then, is not whether courts should
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D.
533 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
The petitioner may wish to recover attorneys' fees directly from individual members of
a definable-but non-certified--class. Commentators posit two obstacles--one legal and one
practical. As for the legal obstacle, commentators state that a petitioner may not obtain an
in personam judgment for attorneys' fees against beneficiaries. See Note, supra note 6, 25
DRAKE L. REv. at 731. Cf. Berger, supra note 5, at 298 n.84 (courts unwilling to impose
binding in personam obligations for attorneys' fees against beneficiaries); Note, supra note
49, at 944 (courts do not attempt to tax nonparticipating beneficiaries directly). These
commentators apparently overlook Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974), in which the court did not suggest that the plaintiff acted
improperly by suing the minority shareholders directly. See notes 57-61 and accompanying
text supra. No sound legal rationale exists for denying a benefactor an in personam judg-
ment on an unjust enrichment claim so long as he can establish with reasonable accuracy
each beneficiary's proportionate share of the expenses. Nevertheless, a practical obstacle
does exist. Plaintiffs conferring a relatively small benefit on each of many class members
will find it economically infeasible to obtain personal jurisdiction over each beneficiary.
7 1 See Wolf v. General Motors-UAW Supp. Unemployment Benefit Plan Bd. of Ad-
min., 569 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir. 1978) (common benefit exception depends upon proven caus-
al relationship between counsel's efforts and benefit).
72 See, e.g., Academic Computer Sys., Inc. v. Yarmuth, 71 F.R.D. 198, 200-02 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). The court found compelling an inference that bondholders' apathy caused the
abandonment of a solicitation of consents for the elimination of certain restrictions on a
trust indenture. The court noted that the defendant did not terminate its solicitation upon
learning of the lawsuit. Rather, the defendant terminated its effort to obtain the needed
two-thirds approval when after ten months of work only 56% of the bondholders had
responded.
73 See, e.g., Ackerman v. Board of Educ., 387 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court
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require a showing of causation, but rather what standard of causa-
tion they should employ. Great diversity of opinion exists among
courts, and even within courts, as to the appropriate standard.
Two Third Circuit cases decided in the same year conflict on
their facts on this issue. In Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 4 the court stated
that the petitioner could recover attorneys' fees if his efforts "caused
others to benefit. s7 5 In Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc.,76 the same
circuit held that the Committee's litigious efforts 'forced the Fund
trustees to commence the delinquency lawsuits, that these lawsuits
produced the fund and that the committee's counsel fees ... are
properly payable out of the Fund. 77 Earlier in the opinion, how-
ever, the Honeybrook Mines court stated that the issue on the fee
petition was "whether or not the committee ... helped to create a
fund for the class for which it acted. 17 8 Moreover, an examination
of the facts suggests that the court may actually have found that
the Committee, at most, helped to create the fund. The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff should receive attorneys' fees for its prior
suit, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9
The trustees had filed their first complaint fourteen months after
the Committee had initiated its suit and after the district court had
dismissed the Committee's suit. Did the Committee's suit force the
trustees to make a move or did it merely contribute to the trustees'
action? A vigorous dissent stated:
If the majority is of the opinion that the Committee is entitled to
counsel fees simply for having "helped" to create the recoveries
for the Fund, then this is a departure from existing case law and
a wide expansion of the fund cases doctrine .... In this Circuit's
recent Kahan opinion . . . the Court stated that a necessary
prerequisite for recovery of counsel fees was a determination
that it was "the plaintiff's effort which caused others to benefit."
(Emphasis supplied.) But if as strongly appears, the majority is
concluding as a matter of law that the Committee's actions "pro-
duced" the recoveries involved, I completely disagree.80
found that the defendant mooted the claim in response to an amendment of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act which brought employment discrimination by state agencies within the
Act's ambit.
74 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970). For a discussion of this case,
see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
75 424 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
76 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971). For a discussion of
this case, see notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
77 428 F.2d at 985 (emphasis added).
78Id. (emphasis added).
79 See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
'o 428 F.2d at 988 (footnote omitted).
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Similar confusion as to the proper standard of causation exists
in the Second Circuit. In Wechsler v. Southeastern Properties, Inc."1 the
New York State Attorney General initiated an investigation of a
public stock offering made by Southeastern. Several weeks later,
Wechsler filed a class action against Southeastern on behalf of all
purchasers of the offered stock. Four months after Wechsler filed,
the Attorney General initiated a formal action against Southeast-
ern. The district court then directed that the Wechsler action be
held in abeyance until the court could determine whether the At-
torney General's suit would adequately protect the interests of all
involved. The Attorney General eventually reached a settlement, in
the nature of a consent injunction, with the defendant. After con-
cluding that the injunction adequately protected the interests of the
class, the court dismissed Wechsler's suit as moot and denied his
petition for attorneys' fees, finding that he had not directly assisted
the Attorney General.82
In affirming the denial of legal fees, the Second Circuit stated:
An essential condition precedent to the award . . . is a showing
that the attorney's services were a competent producing cause of
the supposed benefit conferred .... Where ... the private action
follows upon the coattails of a government suit or investigation
which has provided the basis for the claim, it has been suggested
that the court's inquiry be directed at whether the services ren-
dered played any part in achieving a successful result .... 83
The court then applied this standard to the case at hand:
"Wechsler did not offer to submit any direct or circumstantial evi-
dence (such as affidavits from the Attorney General's Office or
from the defendants) tending to show that he or the pendency of
his action materially assisted the Attorney General's investigation
and prosecution of the state court action or added any pressure
leading to settlement. '84 Thus, under the Wechsler test, a petitioner
can recover legal fees if he can show that his suit contributed to the
creation of a benefit.8 5 This "contributed" standard is more liberal
than the "caused" standard employed by the Kahan court and by
the dissent in Honeybrook Mines.
8' 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
821d. at 633.
:3 Id. at 635.84 Id. at 636.
'5 Technically, the "contributed" standard in Wechsler is dictum because the court
found no evidence tending to snow that Wechsler's suit helped the Attorney General.
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Another Second Circuit case, Grace v. Ludwig,86 applied an
even stricter standard of causation than that used by the Kahan
court. In Grace, the plaintiffs' counsel (LLB) had sued in federal
district court to recover legal fees for its intervention in an SEC
proceeding that involved review of an application for a
"short form" merger. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 87 In
affirming the dismissal, the Second Circuit noted:
LLB takes the position ... that it pulled the "laboring oar"
in the SEC proceedings and that primarily through its efforts
[the applicant] continuously increased its offer to the public
shareholders. In the posture this case reaches us, these allega-
tions must be accepted as true. We cannot accept, however, the
premise that but for LLB's intervention the SEC would have
approved as "fair and reasonable" the initial offer of [the appli-
cant]. If LLB had never appeared how can we properly assume
that the SEC would have been so totally supine or so derelict as
to give its approval to a price which plaintiffs urge was not
merely unconscionably low but was in fact the product of a de-
ception and fraud. . . .88
The result would have been different, the court continued, had the
plaintiffs filed a shareholders' derivative suit after the SEC had
been so derelict in its duty as to grant the application,89 that is, had
the plaintiffs clearly been the sole producing cause.
At the other extreme lies Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp.90 The
Delaware Court of Chancery declared that "a plaintiff may not be
deprived of a fee by action taken by a defendant which has the
effect of curing the alleged wrong and rendering the controversy
moot, unless it be demonstrated that the curing of the defect is in
nowise related to the lawsuit ".... 91
Thus, a review of five cases representing three jurisdictions
yields four distinct standards of causation: "sole producing,"
"caused," "contributed" and "minimum relation." This diversity
86 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974). For a discussion of
this case, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
87484 F.2d at 1265.
8 Id. at 1268 (emphasis in original).
891d. at 1269.
90 42 Del. Ch. 279, 209 A.2d 459 (1949).
91 Id. at 281, 209 A.2d at 460. The court made the statement regarding attorneys' fees
after denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court determined that
it should dismiss the suit as moot after holding a hearing on the issue of attorneys' fees.
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creates uncertainty which may spawn needless litigation. Courts
should analyze the issue and develop a uniform standard of causa-
tion. The "contributed" standard appears to offer those qualities
that would make the best uniform test. It requires a sufficiently
substantial relationship between the plaintiff's suit and the benefit
conferred to ensure that the class was indeed unjustly enriched at
the petitioner's expense. Yet the standard does not demand that a
petitioner who incurred great expense on behalf of his class prove
that his efforts were the sole cause of the benefit. This balance
comports with the view expressed by the Third Circuit in Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.92 that
attorneys' fee awards are not an all-or-nothing proposition. Lindy
Bros. instructs trial judges confronted with a petition for legal fees
to set the amount of the award according to the following criteria:
(1) the hours expended by the attorneys in pursuit of the benefit;
(2) the value of the attorneys' services to the beneficiaries; (3) the
contingent nature of success; and (4) the quality of the attorneys'
work. The fourth criterion subdivides into the novelty of the issues,
the value of the benefit conferred, 93 and the complexity of the
issues. 94 These criteria allow the judge to adjust the award after
considering the extent of the petitioner's contribution to the ben-
efit conferred upon the class.
2. Burden of Proof
Under any standard of causation, a close case may turn upon
who bears the burden of proof. Recent federal decisions hold that
the petitioner has the burden of proof on the causation issue. In
Kahan v. Rosenstiel,95 for example, the Third Circuit remanded the
case to the district court "where plaintiff has the burden of proving
the allegations set forth in his complaint and petition. ' 96 The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Wechsler v. Southeastern Properties, Inc., 97 agreed:
[T]he mere institution of a stockholder's action does not guaran-
tee that the plaintiff will be awarded attorney's fees upon his suit
92 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
93 The monetary value of the benefit conferred may be the only means by which the
court can measure the quality of the attorneys' performance where the defendant moots
the case before any significant in-court proceedings occur.
94 487 F.2d at 166-69. For a similar list of considerations, see ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106(B) (1975). Berger, supra note 5, at 315-26, suggests an
interesting new formula for calculating the amount of attorneys' fee awards.
95 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
96 Id. at 174 (footnote omitted).
97 506 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
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being mooted by the successful prosecution or settlement of
some other action. Causation must still be shown and the burden
of establishing it remains with the plaintiff. Chrysler Corp. v.
Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386-387 (Del.1966). 68
More recently, in Academic Computer Systems, Inc. v. Yarmuth, 99 a
federal district court held:
Under the exception pursuant to which fees may be allowed
to a party who has recovered or preserved a fund for the benefit
of others in addition to himself, the requisite showing must be
that (a) plaintiff had a meritorious claim, (b) a substantial benefit
was conferred, and (c) the benefit was caused by the plaintiffs
taking action .... The burden of proof of these essentials is on
the plaintiff who seeks the recovery. Wechsler, supra.'00
Note that Yarmuth follows Wechsler, and that Wechsler follows
Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, a Delaware Supreme Court decision. Al-
though the Kahan court did not cite Chrysler Corp. v. Dann on the
burden of proof issue, it did cite the case elsewhere in its opin-
ion; 1 1 thus the Delaware holding probably influenced the Third
Circuit on the burden of proof issue.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Palley,0 2 the Delaware Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of Chrysler Corp. v. Dann:
As to burden of proof, the mootness tests of Rosenthal v.
Burry Biscuit Corporation, 42 Del.Ch. 279, 209 A.2d 459 (1949)
and Mintz v. Bohen, Del.Ch., 210 A.2d 569 (1965) apply: where
a stockholder's derivative suit has been rendered moot by sub-
sequent action of the defendant, the latter has the burden of
showing no causal connection between the two in order to defeat
the stockholder's claim for legal fees and expenses.
McDonnell contends that the mootness rule of Burry Biscuit
was rejected by this Court in Chrysler. Such was not intended;
indeed, Burry Biscuit was cited with approval in Chrysler. To
clarify any doubt arising from language in Chrysler, we hereby
expressly approve the mootness rule of Burry Biscuit. 0 3
Sound policy supports the Palley holding. Since the defendant
knows why it mooted the plaintiff's claim and has easier access to
98 Id. at 635.
99 71 F.R.D. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100 Id. at 201.
101 424 F.2d at 167.
102 310 A.2d 635 (Del. 1973).
103 Id. at 637.
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evidence proving its motivation, 10 4 the defendant should bear the
burden of proof on the issue of causation." 5 Thus Wechsler, de-
cided more than one year after Palley, not only miscites Chrysler
Corp. v. Dann as authority but also represents unsound policy.
Where the plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys' fees from the de-
fendant, as in a shareholder's derivative suit, federal courts should
shift the burden of proof on the issue of causation to the defen-
dant. Where the plaintiff seeks to recover legal expenses from a
fund benefiting nonparties, the plaintiff should shoulder the bur-
den of proof because neither the plaintiff nor the other ben-
eficiaries have superior access to evidence of causation.
C. Conclusion
A plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees on a mooted claim
under the common benefit theory. As the law presently stands,
however, the plaintiff will receive an award only if the court finds
that his initial suit was meritorious'0 6 and that the defendant
mooted the claim in response to the suit.10 7 Courts diverge as to the
specifics of both the meritorious claim test' 08 and the causation
test.'0 9 The rationale underlying the common benefit theory-that
104 Cf. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 227, 222 N.W.2d 71, 82 (1974) (burden of
proof on questions of good faith, fair dealing, and loyalty of officer to corporation should
rest upon officer because relevant facts more likely to be within his knowledge).
In the shareholder's derivative suit context, the defendant corporation (functionally its
directors) will always know why it mooted the suit. Three possible scenarios exist. (A) The
shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation to enforce a right against a third party who
has wronged the corporation. The corporation has the same directors at all relevant
times-when it initially refuses to sue the third party, when it moots the derivative suit by
suing and recovering from the third party, and when the plaintiff demands attorneys' fees.
The directors faced with the demand for fees have first-hand knowledge of the reasons for
mooting the derivative suit. (B) The shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation to re-
cover damages against individual directors who wronged the corporation. The old board is
purged, but the new directors fail to move against the former directors to recover dam-
ages. At some later date, the corporation sues or settles with the former directors. The new
board, which will receive the plaintiff's petition for attorneys' fees, knows why the corpora-
tion instituted its own suit or settled the claim. (C) The shareholder sues on behalf of the
corporation to recover damages from individual directors who wronged the corporation. In
a single transaction, the old board is purged and the former directors voluntarily pay dam-
ages to the corporation. The members of the new board, some of whom may have served
on the old board, know the circumstances surrounding the change in leadership, and are
in a better position than the shareholder to explain the motivation behind the change.
105 See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (2d
ed. E. Clearly 1972).
106 See notes 20-42 and accompanying text supra.
10' See notes 71-94 and accompanying text supra.
'
0 8 See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
"95 See notes 74-91 and accompanying text supra.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
the beneficiaries would be unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's ex-
pense if they did not contribute to his legal costs-does not support
the use of the meritorious claim test.110 A more appropriate ap-
proach to evaluating petitions for attorneys' fees would speak di-
rectly to the legitimate concerns of the court-equity and subject
matter jurisdiction."' The principal problem in the causation area
arises from the great diversity of standards now in use. 1 2 A ra-
tional uniform standard would require a substantial causal link
between the plaintiff's suit and the defendant's action, but would
not require that the plaintiff's suit be the sole cause of the defen-
dant's action.' ' 3 Finally, federal courts have compounded the plain-
tiff's difficulties by saddling him with the burden of proof on the
issue of causation." 4 Although appropriate where the plaintiff
seeks to recover from a fund that benefits nonparties, this allocation
conflicts with sound policy where the plaintiff seeks reimbursement
from the defendant. The defendant knows better than the plaintiff
why it mooted the claim, and has easier access to evidence proving
its motivation."15
II
RECOVERY UNDER THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION
A. Interpretation of the Statutes
1. Introduction
Statutes authorizing fee awards constitute the second major
exception to the American Rule on attorneys' fees." 6 When a de-
fendant moots a claim grounded on a statute that permits recovery
of attorneys' fees, the plaintiff does not automatically lose his op-
portunity to obtain a fee award."7 The language of many statutes,
110 See notes 30-41 and accompanying text supra.
I See notes 42-70 and accompanying text supra.
112 See notes 74-91 and accompanying text supra.
"'See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
14 See notes 95-101 and accompanying text supra.
115 See notes 102-05 and accompanying text supra.
116 Although Congress had already passed numerous statutes authorizing attorneys' fee
awards, the Alyeska decision prompted the passage of several additional fee provisions. See,
e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp.
1977). The Senate report accompanying the bill stated: "The purpose of this amendment is
to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by ... Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Society .... " S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5909.
117 Litigation under legislation providing a statutory penalty may represent an excep-
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however, does not require such a result and, in fact, the language
of some statutes appears to preclude it. Fee-shifting statutes fall
into two generic categories. 118 The first category encompasses stat-
utes that permit a grant of attorneys' fees to a "prevailing" plain-
tiff.119 "Prevailing" language lends itself to flexible interpretation,
tion to this statement, but a defendant would not normally moot such an action. For exam-
ple, § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides: "Any person who shall be
injured . . .by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue .. .and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." A defendant litigating under this provision probably would not
moot the action, i.e., would not voluntarily pay the plaintiff threefold the damages alleged
in the complaint, because juries almost never award the full amount demanded. Should the
defendant do so, however, case law indicates that the court would not grant attorneys' fees
to the plaintiff. In the context of a settled claim, the court in Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1974) stated:
Section 4 of the Clayton Act... which provides for the award of attorneys' fees in
civil antitrust suits generally, does not authorize award of attorneys' fees to a
plaintiff who does not recover a judgment or who settles his claim with the defen-
dant .... The only basis for awarding an attorney's fee in such cases is the equita-
ble fund theory doctrine ....
Accord, Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 164 (3d Cir. 1973).
"a This Note cannot discuss the particular law surrounding each attorneys' fee provi-
sion in every federal and state statute. Rather, it will illustrate general trends in the field
through the use of several statutes of current interest.
119 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); CAL. Gov'T CODE §
6259 (West Supp. 1977) (inspection of public records); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198 (McKinney
Supp. 1977) (employee wage claims). The precise language varies from statute to statute.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) states that "the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976), pro-
vides that the court may give an award to a complainant who has "substantially prevailed."
Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970), the court must award attorneys'
fees to a petitioner who "finally prevail[s]." These nuances do not affect recovery of legal
fees on mooted claims. See note 148 infra. Thus, the two categories set forth in the text
reflect judicial treatment of statutory language.
Some statutes allow attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party," be he plaintiff or defen-
dant. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Others provide only
"prevailing plaintiffs" with awards. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)
(1970). The distinction between "party" and "plaintiff" bears no significance where the
defendant has mooted the claim.
In some statutes Congress had ordained that courts "shall" award attorneys' fees to
prevailing plaintiffs. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). Other
statutes provide that courts "may" grant fee awards. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). Under the optional fee provisions, courts employ a different
test for each statute to guide their discretion. In a few of the statutes, Congress provided
the tests. For example, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970), states:
"The court may grant ... reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff:
Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume
said attorney's fees." For other statutes, courts provide their own tests. In Newman v. Pig-
gie Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), an action involving Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
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and courts have encountered little difficulty in construing such
provisions to include mooted claims. 2 ' The second category of
statutes allows attorneys' fees upon 'judgment"'121 or upon the is-
suance of a "final order."'1 22 On its face, this language seems to
preclude an award of fees in a mooted case. In fact, neither Con-
gress nor the courts read this language to bar recovery. 123
2. Prevailing Party
A substantial number of federal statutes providing fee-reim-
bursement to the prevailing plaintiff cover areas of contemporary
national interest, such as civil rights' 24 and open government.
2 5
As a result, courts have had ample opportunity to construe
this legislation. The leading case interpreting "prevailing" plain-
tiff is Parker v. Matthews.126 Dorothy Parker had filed an admin-
istrative complaint with the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) alleging discrimination based on race and sex,
and demanding immediate promotion from her position as a GS-9
to GS-13. A HEW staff officer conducted an investigation and re-
commended that Ms. Parker receive the promotion. HEW advanced
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), the Court stated that "one who succeeds in obtaining
an injunction ...should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust." 390 U.S. at 402. Under still other statutes, courts
employ tests suggested by legislative history. When confronted with a petition for attorneys'
fees under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976), for example,
courts examine four factors to determine whether an award should issue: (1) the public
benefit; (2) the commercial benefit to the complainant; (3) the nature of the complainant's
interest in the records sought; and (4) the reasonableness of the government's legal basis
for withholding the material. See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Marshall, 439 F.
Supp. 1267, 1270 (D.D.C. 1977). The Senate version of the Freedom of Information Act
expressly included these criteria. The conference committee removed them from the final
version of the bill, but stated: "By eliminating these criteria, the conferees do not intend to
make the award of attorney fees automatic or to preclude the courts, in exercising their
discretion as to awarding such fees, to take into consideration such criteria." H.R. REP. No.
1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). Courts have chosen to use the deleted criteria to
guide their discretion. This secondary level of eligibility, however, exceeds the scope of this
Note. Part II considers only the two threshold questions of eligibility: (1) Can a plaintiff
ever recover statutory attorneys' fees on a mooted claim, and if so, (2) What tests common
to all fee-shifting statutes must a plaintiff satisfy to become eligible for an award?120 See notes 124-54 and accompanying text infra.
121 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
3733.10 (b) (Page Supp. 1978) (actions against trailer park operators).
122 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V 1975).
123 See notes 155-66 and accompanying text infra.
124 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
125 See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
126 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (government did not raise prevailing party issue on appeal).
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Ms. Parker to GS- 11, but stated that it would disregard the staff
officer's report and recommendation. Ms. Parker then filed suit in
federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,127 seeking promo-
tion to GS-13 and back pay. Defendant's answer denied all allega-
tions of the complaint. Two months after the plaintiff filed her
suit, HEW reversed its position and issued a formal decision admit-
ting that it had discriminated against Ms. Parker and agreeing to
promote her retroactively to GS-13. The parties entered into a
formal settlement of the pending suit. The plaintiff then petitioned
the court for statutory attorneys' fees.128 HEW opposed the peti-
127 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975). Originally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 did not apply to federal employees. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S.
820, 825 (1976). Congress eliminated this immunity in 1972. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(Supp. V 1975)).
128 The petitioner invoked 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. V 1975), which incorporates
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). The latter statute provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
The final clause contrasts with the general waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
litigation costs, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), which explicitly excludes attorneys' fees.
If a federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over a mooted or settled claim, then
it retains jurisdiction to consider the award of attorneys' fees. See Cueno v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Plaintiffs must request an award of statutory legal fees as
part of the original action and may not bring an independent action to recover these fees.
See Rural Fire Protect. Co. v. Hepp, 366 F.2d 355, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1966) (discussing Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). This limitation contrasts
sharply with the law regarding recovery of attorneys' fees under the common benefit ex-
ception. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra. The disparate origins of the two
exceptions justify this difference. Conferral of a common benefit gives rise to an indepen-
dent claim based on unjust enrichment. Prevailing under a statute, on the other hand,
entitles the plaintiff only to what the statute provides. He remains tied to the original cause
of action. Moreover, the language of the attorneys' fee provisions indicates that Congress
intended courts to award attorneys' fees as part of costs (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1970)), or simultaneously with the award of costs (see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
Under the common benefit exception, the right to a fee award accrues directly to the
plaintiff's attorney. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra. Under the statutory ex-
ception, earlier cases held that the right to recover legal fees accrued exclusively to the
plaintiff, and not to his attorney. See First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas &
Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 630, 632 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957) (Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970)); Ferraro v. Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2d Cir.
1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). But see
Maddrix v. Dize, 153 F.2d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). More recent cases, however, evidence a greater willingness
to award fees directly to attorneys. In Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977),
for example, the court considered whether a successful plaintiff, represented without
charge by a federally funded legal services organization, could recover attorneys' fees
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tion, arguing that a prevailing party is one who has obtained a
favorable judgment after a full adjudication on the merits. The
court rejected HEW's proposition: "If the Court were to adopt
defendant's suggested meaning plaintiffs would be forced to try
every case for the purpose of insuring an award of attorneys'
fees."'1 29 Such a result, the court noted, would contravene the pol-
icy of encouraging settlement of litigation.130 The court also found
that the defendant's interpretation would undermine the policy
considerations behind the attorneys' fee provision. Civil rights
plaintiffs are often impecunious. The attorneys' fee provision ena-
bles them to obtain counsel who can effectively enforce their rights
to freedom from discrimination. 131 If a defendant could escape
reimbursement by mooting the claim, plaintiffs would have diffi-
culty finding competent counsel who would be willing to risk re-
ceiving less than adequate compensation. Relying on these consid-
erations, the court granted the petitioner's request.
under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). In affirming the assessment of a fee
award against the defendant, the court stated: "The presence of an attorney-client relation-
ship suffices to entitle prevailing litigants to receive fee awards. . . . Of course, since the
object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards must
accrue to counsel." 569 F.2d at 1245. Accord, Hairston v. R & R Apts., 510 F.2d 1090, 1093
(7th Cir. 1975). Cf. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 47 n.21, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 n.21,
141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327 n.21 (1977) (propriety of direct award to plaintiff's public interest
attorney in exercise of court's equitable powers no longer questioned).
These two lines of cases are reconcilable. The statutory language of the various fee
provisions suggests that a court should award attorneys' fees to a plaintiff as part of the
judgment. For example, the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 7 84(g)
(1970), provides: "[The court, as a part of its judgment decree, shall determine and allow
reasonable fees for the attorneys .... " The attorney will then look to his client for pay-
ment. See Ferraro v. Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1946). This
system properly underscores the central role of the client in litigation. ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-1 (1975) explains: "The professional responsibility of a
lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting mem-
bers of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits" (emphasis add-
ed). When the plaintiff stands to reap a windfall, however, sound policy supports giving
the award directly to the legal services organization. Fee awards to legal aid offices will
enhance their ability to enforce congressionally favored rights of plaintiffs unable to obtain
private counsel. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally Note,
1976 Developments in Welfare Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1050, 1072-76 (1977).
Preexisting fee arrangements between the prevailing party and his attorney do not
affect the propriety of an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under a statute. See Sargeant
v. Sharp, No. 77-1239 (1st Cir. May 16, 1978). The Sargeant court held that the client, who
had already paid her counsel a contingent fee, should receive reimbursement for the
amount paid with any excess of the award going to counsel.
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In Foster v. Boorstin,3 2 the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
tended the holding of Parker v. Matthews to mooted claims. The
facts of Foster are indistinguishable from those underlying Parker
except that the parties in Foster did not enter into a formal settle-
ment of the suit.' 33 In granting the plaintiff's petition for attor-
neys' fees, the court stated:
Surely the effectiveness of this incentive for persons of limited
means would be greatly diminished if the complainant were
forced to bear the expense of his attorneys' fees whenever the
Government chose to award the requested relief after a court
action had been filed but prior to ajudgment or a court order. 34
The court would not permit defendants to weaken the civil rights
law by impairing one of its primary enforcement tools. 135
Parker and Foster represent a recent trend.' 36 The legislative
history accompanying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
neither required nor prohibited the development of this trend. In
debates surrounding Title VII's adoption, Congress paid scant at-
tention to the attorneys' fee provision.13 7 Only Senator Humphrey
referred to the rationale for providing plaintiffs with an opportu-
nity to recover their legal fees. He stated that the drafters included
the provision to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to
bring a meritorious suit.' 138 The Senator's statement gives little
132 561 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
133 In Foster, a black bindery foreman filed a "complaint of discrimination" with his
employer, the Library of Congress, alleging that two white supervisors had discriminated
against him by selecting a less qualified applicant for promotion to GS-12. Two months
after the foreman filed his complaint, the Coordinator of the Library's Equal Opportunity
Office cancelled it for "failure to prosecute." The plaintiff appealed the cancellation, but
the Deputy Librarian concurred with the Coordinator. The foreman then sued his em-
ployer in federal district court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), seeking the promotion, back pay and
attorneys' fees. Three weeks after the plaintiff filed his action, the Deputy Librarian re-
scinded the cancellation of the administrative complaint. After the Library's Equal Oppor-
tunity Office investigated the complaint, the plaintiff received a promotion to GS-12. The
plaintiff then successfully petitioned the court for legal fees.
134 561 F.2d at 342.
135 See id. at 342-43. Accord, Fischer v. Adams, No. 77-1264 (1st Cir. May 17, 1978)
(party who prevailed on merits of discrimination complaint in administrative proceeding
before Civil Service Commission may receive fee award from federal district court under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) after defendant mooted complaint for back pay).
136 Parker v. Matthews, the leading case cited on the issue of attorneys' fees on mooted
claims, was decided in 1976.
13. See Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 334 app. (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'g Parker v.
Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976).
138 110 CONG. REC. 12724 (1964).
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guidance on the issue of mooted claims. The legislative history of
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,139 however,
unequivocally supports recovery of attorneys' fees on mooted civil
rights claims. This Act tracks the language of the counsel fee provi-
sions of Titles 11140 and VII 141 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964142
and was designed to "achieve uniformity in the remedies provided
by Federal laws guaranteeing civil and constitutional rights.' 43
After reviewing the major civil rights legislation of the past fifteen
years, the Senate Report 144 accompanying the bill stated:
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private en-
forcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if
private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate
the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen
who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with
which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert
their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamen-
tal laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have
the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.145
The Report then concluded that "for purposes of the award of
counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when
they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without for-
mally obtaining relief."' 46 The House Report concurred with its
139 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977). The statute provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or
proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charg-
ing a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
142 H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
14 Id. at 1.
144 Congress enacted the Senate version, which differed from its House counterpart
only in minor details.
145 S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5908, 5910.
146 Id. at 5, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 5912. Following the sentence
quoted above, the Report cited several cases, without explanation, including Thomas v.
Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
Unlike the other cases included in the string cite, Honeybrook Mines involved not statutory at-
torneys' fees, but the common benefit exception. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text
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Senate counterpart on this point: "A 'prevailing' party should not
be penalized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to
lessen docket congestion. Similarly, after a complaint is filed, a
defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice."' 47 Thus,
Congress and the courts agree that a civil rights plaintiff can be a
prevailing party on a mooted claim for the purpose of an attorneys'
fee award.
Courts have similarly interpreted prevailing plaintiff language
to include mooted claims outside the civil rights area. For example,
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides that a "court
may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees ... in
any case under this section in which the complainant has substan-
tially prevailed.' 48 The Senate Report 149 accompanying the bill
noted that many witnesses viewed an attorneys' fee provision "as
crucial to effectuating the original congressional intent that judicial
review be available to reverse agency refusals to adhere strictly to
the Act's mandates. Too often the barriers presented by court costs
and attorneys' fees are insumountable [sic] for the average person
requesting information, allowing the government to escape com-
pliance with the law."' 50 After reviewing the Act's legislative his-
tory, Judge Friendly asserted in Vermont Low Income Advocacy Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Usety' 5' that a plaintiff could recover statutory attorneys'
fees on a mooted claim. Illustrating his analysis with a hypothetical,
he stated that "Congress clearly did not mean that where an FOIA
supra. Undoubtedly, the Report cited Honeybrook Mines for the proposition that a plaintiff
can recover legal fees on a mooted claim.
141 H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
148 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). The nuances in language among the "prevailing
party" statutes, discussed in note 119 supra, do not affect the recovery of legal fees on
mooted claims. Courts in FOIA cases, interpreting a statute that provides an award to
plaintiffs who have "substantially prevailed," cite for support Title VII cases applying a
statute that provides attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party." See, e.g., American Fed'n of
Gov't Emp. v. Rosen, 418 F. Supp. 205, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Likewise, courts in civil
rights cases cite indiscriminately to FOIA cases. See, e.g., Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340,
342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Courts have not yet had occasion to determine whether statutes
that grant legal fees to a plaintiff who "finally prevails," such as the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970), will support an award on a mooted claim. However, the court
in Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059 (D.D.C. 1976), aff d sub nom. Parker v. Cali-
fano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977), stated that "[t]he use of the words 'finally prevails'
does not appear to distinguish these statutes from those that use the words 'prevailing
party."' 411 F. Supp. at 1064 n.4.
149 Except for a minor deletion (see note 119 supra), Congress passed the Sen-
ate version of the attorneys' fee provision. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1974).
150 S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974).
151 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976).
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suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the
judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could
abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the
information requested.' 52 The District of Columbia Circuit, in
Cuneo v. Rumsfeld,153 reached the same conclusion:
In enacting section 552(a)(4)(E) Congress sought to encour-
age the average person, who would ordinarily find the barriers
of court costs and attorney fees insurmountable, to pursue
legitimate FOIA actions. The effectiveness of this incentive
would be greatly diminished if the complainant was forced to
bear the costs whenever the government chose to release the
requested information during the pendency of the action but
prior to a judgment or a court order.154
Thus, a plaintiff litigating under a statute that has prevailing plain-
tiff language does not lose his eligibility to recover attorneys' fees
solely because the defendant moots the claim.
3. Final Order or Judgment
Numerous federal statutes permit courts to award attorneys'
fees to litigants upon 'judgment ' 155 or upon the issuance of a
"final order."' 56 A literal reading of this language would preclude
an award of legal fees if the defendant moots the claim. Such a
reading would be unreasonable. These statutes embody the same
policies that support the award of fees on mooted claims under
prevailing party language. For example, in the FOIA cases, the
courts rejected a flat prohibition of awards on mooted claims be-
cause it would create inefficiency by forcing plaintiffs to litigate
to judgment to obtain attorneys' fees,' 57 and would inhibit enforce-
ment of the Act by greatly limiting an important incentive for
citizens' suits. 158 This same reasoning applies to legislation such
as section 431(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
152 Id. at 513. The third exception to the American Rule--defendant's bad faith-
would also support an award of attorneys' fees in Judge Friendly's hypothetical. See note 6
supra.
153 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1 41Id. at 1365 (footnote omitted).
155 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 77(k)(e) (1970).
1'6 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V 1975).157 See Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum). This rationale
speaks only to settlements because a plaintiff does not have the option to pursue the case if
the defendant moots it.
5s See Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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sure Act of 1959,- 9 which grants any union member a right of
action against his labor organization if the organization denies
him access to its annual financial report. Section 431(c) provides
that a "court in such action may, ... in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff. .. , allow a reasonable attorney's fee to
be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.' ' 60
Fortunately, neither Congress nor the courts have interpreted
'judgment" or "final order" to bar recovery on mooted claims.
Legislative history on this question is scarce and no federal court
has decided this precise point, but substantial evidence indicates
that the issue is not seriously in doubt. For instance, section 505(d)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
provides that "[t]he court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.' 1 6' The
Senate Report accompanying the bill stated:
The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate ac-
tions under this section citizens would be performing a public
service and in such instances, the courts should award costs of
litigation to such party. This should extend to plaintiffs in actions
which result in successful abatement but do not reach a verdict.
For instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a
verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may
award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting
such actions.162
The seemingly restrictive "final order" language did not prevent
the Senate committee from explicitly sanctioning fee awards on
mooted claims.
Cases dealing with 'Judgment" statutes support, at least by
analogy, awards on mooted claims. Section 11 (e) of the Securities
Act of 1933 provides:
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter the
court may . . . require an undertaking for the payment of the
159 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1970). In support of the proposed Act, Senator McClellan
stated that "racketeering; corruption, abuse of power, and other improper practices" would
never be prevented until Congress mandated "minimum standards of democratic process."
105 CONG. REc. 6471 (1959).
160 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1970).
161 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. V 1975).




costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if
judgment shall be rendered against a party litigant, upon the
motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in
favor of such party litigant ... if the court believes the suit or the
defense to have been without merit .... 163
In Oil & Gas Income, Inc. v. Trotter'64 the plaintiff had sued O.B.
Trotter and Woods Exploration and Producing Company, alleging
a violation of section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 arising from
misstatements or omissions of material fact in a registration state-
ment and prospectus. After several inconclusive hearings, the
plaintiff settled with Woods Company, then voluntarily dismissed
his suit against both Woods Company and Trotter. Trotter
petitioned the court for costs and attorneys' fees. The district court
granted Trotter's petition after finding that the plaintiff's suit
lacked merit. The appellate court affirmed the award without dis-
cussing the interpretive difficulties presented by the 'Judgment"
language in the statute.' 65 If the statute permits an award of attor-
163 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e) (1970).
164 395 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1968).
16 5 Id. Accord, Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1972). In Klein, the trial
court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's claim under the Securities Act of 1933 and
awarded attorneys' fees to the defendant under 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e) (1970). The Second
Circuit remanded the case because the trial judge had failed to make an explicit finding
that the plaintiff's suit lacked merit. Id. at 1347-48. The appellate court apparently as-
sumed that the judgment language did not bar a fee award, since the court made no
reference to the issue.
In International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 66 Cal. App. 3d 521, 135 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1977),
the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his suit. The court awarded attorneys' fees to the defen-
dant under CAL CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 1973). Section 1717 reads:
In any action on a contract, where such contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such
contract, shall be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether he is
the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements.
As used in this section "prevailing party" means the party in whose favor final
judgment is rendered.
The court supported its interpretation of the statute with four reasons. First, the word
'judgment" includes any judgment, not just a judgment on the merits. Settlement of costs
is a judgment for costs. Therefore, the court may award attorneys' fees upon entering such
a judgment. Second, the statute states that costs include attorneys' fees. A party is entitled
to receive ordinary costs on a voluntary dismissal, so he should receive his full costs includ-
ing legal fees. Third, the targets of the statute, adhesion contracts with attorneys' fee
clauses, permit plaintiffs to recover fees short of a judgment on the merits. Therefore, to
provide full reciprocity, § 1717 must operate short of a judgment on the merits. Finally, a
voluntary dismissal terminates the litigation just like a judgment on the merits. Olen over-
ruled Associated Convalescent Ents. v. Carl Marks & Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 116, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 782 (1973).
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neys' fees to a defendant when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his
suit, a plaintiff should surely be eligible to recover attorneys' fees
when a defendant moots the action. 166
In sum, legislative history, case law and reason all indicate that
a plaintiff litigating under a statute that includes "prevailing
party," 'judgment" or "final order" language does not lose his eli-
gibility to recover attorneys' fees merely because the defendant
moots the claim.
B. Conditions Precedent to Eligibility
1. Present Diversity of Tests
As with the common benefit exception, 167 the defendant's ac-
tion in mooting a claim does not automatically entitle the plaintiff
to receive statutory attorneys' fees. Courts require the plaintiff to
satisfy certain prerequisites before he becomes eligible for a fee
award. As with the common benefit exception, 68 courts diverge
markedly in their tests of eligibility.
All courts appear to agree on two basic requirements. Judge
Friendly presented these requirements most succinctly in Vermont
Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery: "In order to obtain an
award of attorney fees in an FOIA action, a plaintiff must show at
minimum that the prosecution of the action could reasonably have
been regarded as necessary and that the action had substantial
causative effect on the delivery of the information."'' 69 Other deci-
sions under the Freedom of Information Act 7 0 and under the civil
rights statutes' 7 ' apply these conditions precedent. These two re-
quirements promote the efficient use of judicial resources. If a
plaintiff could have achieved his objectives through nonjudicial
means, the court should not encourage future plaintiffs to waste
courts' time by reimbursing this plaintiff for his expenses.
In Usery Judge Friendly denied the plaintiff's petition for at-
torneys' fees because it failed both requirements. Invoking the
166 A plaintiff in effect moots the case when he requests a voluntary dismissal. Such a
dismissal does not give the defendant anything, but it removes the need for him to litigate
the action. When a defendant moots a claim, he not only removes the need for the plaintiff
to litigate, but also gives something to the plaintiff. Thus mooting more closely resembles a
judgment than does voluntary dismissal.
"'See notes 20 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
168 See notes 21-29 & 74-91 and accompanying text supra.
169 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976).
70 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976).
171 See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (D.D.C. 1976).
[Vol. 63:880
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Freedom of Information Act, the plaintiff had requested certain
documents from the Boston office of the Department of Labor.17 2
The Boston office refused the request, relying on one of the
statutory exemptions from the Act as support for its decision. The
plaintiff appealed to the Solicitor of Labor in Washington. The
Solicitor's good faith attempt to process the appeal within the
statutory time period fell victim to administrative difficulties. Al-
though notified of the reason for the delay, the plaintiff ignored an
opportunity to discuss the problem with a staff member of the
Washington office and instead promptly filed suit. Before the ac-
tion came to trial, the Solicitor solved the administrative problems,
reviewed the appeal, overruled the Boston office, and released the
documents. The court found that "the result here was not one whit
different than if [plaintiff] had withheld legal action and shown
some understanding of the problem created for the Solicitor by the
failure of the regional office to locate the documents.' 7 3
Having established a necessary suit that substantially caused
the defendant's reaction, the plaintiff faces yet a third condition
precedent. Courts diverge widely on the content of this third re-
quirement for fee-reimbursement. Some courts hold the plaintiff
eligible if the defendant's action substantially satisfies the demands
of the plaintiff's complaint. This requirement is illusory in the
context of a mooted suit because a defendant cannot moot a claim
unless he substantially satisfies the plaintiff's demands. In American
Federation of Government Employees v. Rosen,174 a federal district court
held that "plaintiffs have substantially prevailed within the mean-
ing of the Freedom of Information Act... where they are denied
documents in the possession of a federal agency, file suit ... and
while the litigation is pending, defendants surrender the de-
manded documents.' 7 5
Another federal court, in Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v.
Marshall,17 6 employed the same "result" test. The plaintiff had re-
quested certain documents from the Department of Labor under
172 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
173 546 F.2d at 515. Compare Judge Friendly's standard of causation to those discussed
under the common benefit exception. See notes 74-91 and accompanying text supra. The
standard of causation recommended in Part I for use in common benefit cases appears to
parallel Judge Friendly's standard for use in statutory cases. The arguments made in sup-
port of the common benefit standard apply with equal force to the statutory standard. See
notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
174 418 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
17 5 Id. at 209.
176 439 F. Supp. 1267 (D.D.C. 1977).
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the Freedom of Information Act. The Department claimed that
one of the statutory exemptions applied to the request and de-
clined to release the documents. After exhausting administrative
avenues, the plaintiff sued to compel disclosure. Following consid-
erable procedural maneuvering, the Department "determined that
release of the information would not harm the Department or the
public interest.' 1 77 Although it released the material, the Depart-
ment continued to maintain that the exemption covered the docu-
ments. The court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, stating:
"The only requirement is that the movant 'substantially prevail,'
which he may do by causing the release of the information through
litigation.' 178 The court then moved from this "result" test to a
second level of analysis: It applied four fee-reimbursement factors
originally suggested by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary but
omitted from FOIA as enacted. 179 One of these factors is whether
the agency had a reasonable basis in law for withholding the docu-
ments. On this point the trial judge stated:
Although the released documents are available for the Court's
determination of the validity of the exemptions, the Court must
decline the invitation to rule explicitly on the very issues mooted
by the release of the information in this case. Instead, the Court
considers the material only insofar as it may disclose a reasonable
basis for the Department's withholding. 80
The court concluded that the Department's claimed exemption had
no reasonable basis in law.
The "result" test employed by the Rosen and Founding Church
courts is inappropriate in light of the statutory origin of the attor-
neys' fee provision. The Senate Report accompanying the Freedom
of Information Act states:
[I]f a complainant has been successful in proving that a govern-
ment official has wrongfully withheld information, he has acted
as a private attorney general in vindicating an important public
policy. In such cases it would seem tantamount to a penalty to
require the wronged citizen to pay his attorneys' fee to make the
government comply with the law. However, the bill specifies four
criteria to be considered by the court in exercising its discretion:
(1) "The benefit to the public, ... "; (2) "the commercial benefit
177 Id. at 1269.
178 Id.
179 See note 119 supra.
180 439 F. Supp. at 1270.
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to the complainant"; (3) "the nature of" the complainant's "in-
terest in the records sought"; and (4) "whether the government's
withholding of the records sought had a reasonable basis in
law."1 8'
The Senate Report assumes that the plaintiff has already proven
that the agency illegally withheld the documents. After finding that
the defendant violated the law, the court then employs the four
factors to determine whether a fee award should issue on the facts
of the pending case. Neither Rosen nor Founding Church, however,
required a finding that the defendant violated the law. Congress
did not intend to reimburse the plaintiff who extracts from a gov-
ernment agency a document that the agency had a statutory right
to keep confidential.' 18 2 Congress did not intend to provide an in-
centive for plaintiffs to bring unmeritorious actions.' 8 3
Judge Tamm recognized, in Nationwide Building Maintenance,
Inc. v. Sampson,'8 4 that a statutory duty is a prerequisite to liability
for statutory attorneys' fees: "Certainly where the government can
show that information disclosed after initial resistance was nonethe-
less exempt from the FOIA a plaintiff should not be awarded at-
torney fees .... 185 Unfortunately, Judge Tamm also asserted that
"[t]his is an issue which should be addressed to the courts' dis-
cretionary evaluation of the reasonableness of the government's
resistance to a FOIA plaintiff's request, not a reason for requiring
a judgment of wrongful withholding as a prerequisite for the exer-
cise of that discretion."' 8 6 The latter statement is difficult to recon-
cile with the former. A court finding that the defendant did not
181 S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974). The conference committee elimi-
nated the four criteria from the final version of the bill, but courts have adopted them. See
note 119 supra.
182 Congress included the attorneys' fee provision to ensure that private litigants could
afford to prod the government into compliance with the law. See S. REP. No. 854, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974). If the government is complying with the law, the reason for an
award vanishes. This analysis applies with equal force to other fee-shifting statutes. See
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) (purpose behind
most fee provisions to encourage private enforcement of law).
183 Part I of this Note argues that courts should discontinue the use of the meritorious
claim test in common benefit cases. Part II argues that courts must determine that the
underlying action was meritorious before they may award statutory attorneys' fees. No
inconsistency exists because the origins of the two exceptions differ greatly. Conferral of a
common benefit gives rise to an independent claim based on unjust enrichment. Success
under a statute gives the plaintiff only what the statute provides. He thus remains tied to
the original cause of action.
184 559 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1977).




violate the law should never reach discretionary considerations. If
a court does reach discretionary considerations, a showing of "rea-
sonableness of the government's opposition does not preclude a
recovery of costs and attorney fees. '187
The same criticism attaches to the "result" test when courts
apply it to civil rights statutes. In the process of denying an award
of attorneys' fees on an interlocutory appeal in a Title VII action,
the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
[W]e cannot believe Congress would have countenanced as-
sessing fees against a defendant absent any showing of discrimi-
nation. For all we now know, the defendants in this case may be
entirely blameless .... It follows that since [plaintiff] has yet to
demonstrate discrimination, an award of counsel fees would be
inappropriate at this time. 188
Thus, a court should not award attorneys' fees unless the plaintiff
has demonstrated that the defendant has violated the underlying
statute.
Moreover, courts applying the rationale of Rosen and Founding
Church cannot properly hold the defendant's mooting act to be an
admission of liability. In Clanton v. Allied Chemical Corp.,' s9 the court
suggested several reasons for a defendant's mooting of a claim,
none of which significantly relates to the issue of liability. For
example, a defendant might wish to avoid the costs of a trial, the
adverse publicity of a trial, and the risk of losing at trial even if the
risk is slim.1 90 Thus, mootness alone does not prove liability, and a
demonstration of liability must precede the award of attorneys'
fees.
Clanton illustrates a second alternative for the third condition
precedent. In that case, the parties entered into a settlement in
which the defendant agreed to pay $200,000 to the class for its
claims of back pay, to discontinue use of allegedly unlawful
employment tests or educational criteria, to commence an affirma-
tive hiring program for black applicants and a training program
for incumbent black employees, and to appoint an officer to re-
ceive employee complaints of noncompliance with the settlement
agreement. 91 In the settlement agreement, the defendant also
' Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J.).
'88 Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted).
"9 409 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Va. 1976) (settlement action involving Title VII claim).
190 Id. at 284.
191 Id. at 283.
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maintained that it had not violated Title VII, 92 just as the De-
partment of Labor in Founding Church had disclaimed any FOIA
violation upon releasing the documents. 93 The settlement agree-
ment did not address the attorneys' fee issue. Had the court
employed the "result" test, it would undoubtedly have found that
the plaintiff qualified as the prevailing party for the purpose of a
fee award. 194 The Clanton court, however, accepted the proposition
that the court should award legal fees only after the plaintiff has
prevailed on the question of liability.' 95 Moreover, it believed that
any examination of the facts of the case short of a full trial on the
merits would force the court to speculate as to who was the prevail-
ing party.' 96 The court therefore scheduled a trial on the merits to
ascertain whether the plaintiff was the prevailing party.' 9 7 The trial
judge hoped that the great expense associated with a trial on the
merits would prompt the parties to settle.1 98
A serious problem arises if the judge's order does not induce
the desired results. If the parties cannot settle the attorneys' fee
issue because of personality conflicts, disagreements on monetary
issues, the defendant's fear of collateral estoppel benefiting other
potential plaintiffs, or the doctrinal positions of one of the parties,
then the court has saddled itself with a trial on the merits solely to
determine the award of attorneys' fees. The risk that the parties
will be unable to resolve the matter among themselves is greater on
a mooted claim than on a settled claim because normally the moot-
ing defendant has already displayed unwillingness to deal with the
plaintiff.
Parker v. Matthews, 99 a Title VII case, offers a third alternative
for the third condition precedent. In Parker, the parties settled, but
did not agree on the attorneys' fee issue. Instead of giving the
parties another opportunity to settle the matter themselves, the
court declared the plaintiff to be the prevailing party. The court
rested its conclusion on "a close scrutiny of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the settlement, focusing particularly on
the necessity for bringing the action and whether the party is the
192 Id.
193 439 F. Supp. at 1269. See notes 176-80 and accompanying text supra.
194 See notes 176-80 and accompanying text supra.
95 409 F. Supp. at 284-85. See notes 189-90 and accompanying text supa.
196 409 F. Supp. at 284-85.
197 Id. at 285.
1 98 Id.




successful party with respect to the central issue-discrimi-
nation. '20 0 The Parker court realistically assumed that at this stage
of the proceedings, if the parties had not already done so, they
would not settle the attorneys' fees issue themselves. The Parker
approach improves on the Clanton system by avoiding the effort
and expense of a full trial on the merits. Absent a trial on the
merits, however, the risk of error in the reimbursement decision
increases. Congress intended to award legal fees only to plaintiffs
who had meritorious claims.2 0 1 But courts need only take reason-
able steps to ensure that awards coincide with congressional intent.
Clanton exceeds the bounds of reason; the "result" test applied in
Rosen and Founding Church altogether ignores congressional intent.
The Parker approach, by examining what evidence presently exists
and by requesting affidavits, can reduce the risk of error to a
reasonable level.20 2 As presently constructed, however, the Parker
test fails to provide the trial judge with adequate guidance for
focusing his "close scrutiny of the totality of the circumstances."
Courts in the future will need to refine this broadly brushed ap-
proach.
2. Proposed Test
Although plaintiffs can recover statutory attorneys' fees on
mooted claims, 20 3 courts are still developing prerequisites to eligi-
bility.2 0 4 This Note proposes a modified Parker test. A court con-
fronted with a petition for statutory attorneys' fees on a mooted
claim should scrutinize the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the termination of the controversy, using all evidence reason-
ably accessible through affidavits20 5 and an evidentiary hearing. In
200 411 F. Supp. at 1064. The central issue in an FOIA case is whether the defendant
unlawfully withheld information.
201 See notes 181-83 and accompanying text supra.
202 The amount of evidence before the court will bear a direct relationship to the
importance of the attorneys' fee issue. If the court does not have much evidence before it,
the parties have probably not engaged in extensive discovery and trial preparation. There-
fore, the amount of the fee award, if granted, will not be a large sum. Conversely, if the
court has voluminous evidence before it, the parties have probably engaged in extensive
discovery and trial preparation and, therefore, the amount of the fee award may be sub-
stantial. Thus, the court will be more likely to make a correct decision where more money is
at stake.
203 See notes 116-66 and accompanying text supra.
204 See notes 167-202 and accompanying text supra.
205 Cf. Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06. (E.D. Pa. 1976) (after
parties settled Securities Act case court accepted affidavits to determine liability of two
outside directors seeking indemnification from corporation).
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the absence of instructive statutory language or legislative history, a
court undertaking this inquiry should emphasize the following fac-
tors:
(1) Whether the plaintiff needed to invoke the power of the
court to achieve the desired end;
(2) Whether the plaintiff's action contributed to the defendant's
decision to moot the claim;
(3) Whether the defendant is particularly sensitive to public
opinion;
(4) Whether the costs of a trial would have unreasonably bur-
dened the defendant;
(5) Whether an adverse judgment on the merits would have sig-
nificantly affected the defendant;
(6) Whether the plaintiff would probably have prevailed on the
key issue or issues presented by the underlying statute; and
(7) Whether the statute includes special restrictions that apply to
the facts of the case.
Factors (1) and (2) protect the judiciary and society from un-
necessary costs and burdens by denying awards to plaintiffs who
could have achieved their objectives through nonjudicial means. 20 6
Factors (3) through (5) direct the court's attention to consider-
ations other than the merits of the case that may have forced the
defendant to moot the claim. The legislative intent behind statu-
tory attorneys' fees will not support an award if pressures other
than the merits of the case forced the defendant to moot the plain-
tiff's claim and if the probability of plaintiff's success in a trial on
the merits is uncertain.20 7
Factor (6) directs the court to determine, as best as it can,
which party would probably have prevailed on the merits. This
finding will in large part determine whether a fee award should
issue. Congress intended to reimburse only plaintiffs who promote
national policy and enforce their rights against defendants who act
unlawfully. 208 The burden of proof on factor (6) rests upon the
party who would have had the burden at a trial on the merits. For
example, under the Freedom of Information Act 20 9 the burden of
establishing an exemption from mandatory disclosure of govern-
ment records rests with the agency. 210
206 See notes 169-73 and accompanying text supra.
207 See notes 189-90 and accompanying text supra.
200 See notes 181-88 and accompanying text supra.
209 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
210 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
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Factor (7) directs the court's attention to congressional restric-
tions included in the statute. For example, section 11(e) of the
Securities Act of 1933 provides for attorneys' fees only "if the court
believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit."'2 1' If a
court decides that it should grant an award on the basis of factors
(1) through (6), the court must then determine the effect of factor
(7) on its decision.
CONCLUSION
A defendant cannot automatically preclude a plaintiff from
recovering attorneys' fees under either the common benefit excep-
tion or the statutory exception to the American Rule by mooting
the underlying suit. Courts impose certain conditions precedent to
eligibility, however, under both exceptions. The present tests of
eligibility have serious flaws. For fee petitions based on the com-
mon benefit exception, courts should discontinue the meritorious
claim test and substitute an equitable test. For fee petitions
grounded on the statutory exception, courts should adopt a test
that blends equal measures of judicial efficiency and congressional
intent.
Thomas J. Hopkins
211 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
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